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Immigration and Political Equality† 
MICHAEL BLAKE* 
The act of immigration alters several forms of human relationship 
simultaneously.  It represents a change in physical location and so alters 
the relationship between persons represented by geographic concepts 
such as territory and property.  In immigrating, immigrants acquire a 
new place in the world that they may understand, in some sense of the 
word, as their own.  Immigration also alters a political relationship insofar 
as the immigrant acquires a new political status in virtue of that new 
home in the world.  The immigrant ought to be understood as creating 
through the act of immigration a new set of relationships to other 
persons who share the immigrant’s liability to the coercive institutions of 
a political state.  Finally, immigration represents a change in social 
relationships, insofar as the individual joins not simply a political society 
but a social world constituted by the norms and practices of a culture and 
a civil society.  Immigrants are both entitled and obligated to engage in 
the practices constitutive of membership in the society that they have 
joined. 
A full analysis of the political morality of immigration would have to 
deal with all three of these aspects.  Immigration involves the alteration 
of a “place,” a “polity,” and a “people” simultaneously.  However, 
philosophers have only recently begun to examine the issue of immigration, 
and so have not come to terms with the independent moral force each of 
these exerts—let alone the complex interplay of these related concepts.  
 
 †  Previous versions of this paper were presented at the University of San Diego 
School of Law and at the Canadian Political Science Association.  I am grateful to 
audiences at both events for their comments.  I am particularly indebted to Lori Watson 
for her commentary and discussions of these issues. 
 * Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Washington. 
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The notion of place in particular has been underexplored in recent 
discussions of immigration, which is not surprising given the scant 
attention paid to territoriality in political philosophy more generally.1  It 
is more surprising to find that the distinctively political aspect of 
immigration has similarly been undertheorized.  Instead, the most 
common form of ethical thinking about immigration begins with a 
notion of social or national community and derives its conclusions from 
the effects of immigration on the people, rather than on any more 
distinctively political concepts such as democracy or justice.2  We 
should be slightly surprised that in immigration we tend to begin with an 
analysis of culture and social relatedness, and only then proceed to 
politics; after all, in domestic political analysis, we usually proceed in 
the opposite direction—starting with political notions of justice and fair 
play, and disciplining issues of nationalism with reference to these 
concepts.  It would be interesting to see what effect proceeding in this 
manner would have upon our discussions of the morality of immigration. 
I have already discussed elsewhere why this is likely to be a difficult 
task.3  The usual methods and tools of political philosophy are hard to 
apply to this issue because most of these tools assume we already know 
the identity of the parties entitled to political equality and now want to 
know how to understand such equality.  A central moral question for 
immigration—the identity of the people who are entitled to be treated as 
equals—is assumed rather than argued for.  Those who think that all 
persons everywhere are entitled to treatment as political equals tend to 
be advocates for open borders; if the community of people to whom 
rights are distributed includes everyone, then restrictions on immigration 
are inherently unfair.4  Those who think that only members of the local 
community have a right to equal political treatment, conversely, tend to 
think of immigration as a matter of charity and discretion, with perhaps a 
few exceptions for the most needy foreigners.5  Both sides tend to 
 
 1. Mathias Risse and I have, however, written a paper applying geographic 
reasoning to immigration.  See Michael Blake & Mathias Risse, Migration, Territoriality 
and Culture, in NEW WAVES IN APPLIED ETHICS 153 (Jesper Ryberg et al. eds., 2007). 
 2. See, for example, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 35 (1983), and WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 125 (1995).  Both argue that we can only restrict 
immigration by making reference to the national community the state is set up to defend. 
 3. Michael Blake, Immigration, in A COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 224, 224–25 
(R. G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2003). 
 4. See Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. 
OF POL. 251, 251–52 (1987).  Will Kymlicka uses similar reasons in Multicultural 
Citizenship to defend the idea that in the absence of nationalist reasoning, liberal 
theorists would have no moral basis for restrictions on immigration.  KYMLICKA, supra 
note 2, at 125. 
 5. WALZER, supra note 2, at 33. 
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assume away the truly interesting questions of immigration either by 
making the prospective immigrants already fully equal in standing to 
current citizens or by ruling their interests out more or less completely.  
Neither side has produced especially compelling answers. 
In this paper, I begin the process of developing an alternative to 
these methods, one that will play upon the idea that being a prospective 
immigrant—submitting one’s self to the coercive authority of a state for 
purposes of admission—is itself a form of political relationship.  As 
such, the norms of equal treatment undergirding the concept of justice in 
politics must apply with force to those engaging in this relationship.  The 
relationship, however, is not the same as that experienced by those who 
are current citizens.  Prospective immigrants are not subject to the 
coercive control of the government in civil law, criminal law, and the 
like; instead, they are seeking to become subject to these legal forces and 
so have subjected themselves to the coercive authority of the state in that 
state’s process of adjudication.  Focusing on this fact will enable us to 
avoid the two extreme responses to immigration discussed above.  We 
can begin with the idea that political equality is one expression of the 
more basic ideal of moral equality, while acknowledging contextual 
differences in how political equality is to be interpreted in distinct 
circumstances.  We can legitimately differentiate between current citizens 
and prospective immigrants, based not upon the supposed greater moral 
importance of the former, but upon the distinct political contexts in 
which their claims against the state are made.  On this analysis, prospective 
immigrants are entitled to treatment as moral equals—both to each other, 
and to current residents and citizens.  This moral equality, however, does 
not demand that prospective citizens have the same panoply of political 
rights and duties as current citizens.  In the end, we can distinguish 
between citizens and prospective immigrants without abandoning the 
ideals of moral equality that make liberalism an attractive ideal of 
political life. 
In this paper, I aim to introduce this idea and suggest its contours.  I 
will not examine its implications for the geographic and the nationalist 
aspects of immigration—the place and the people, that is.6  A full account 
of immigration, as I say above, would require independent attention to 
all of these aspects.  However, I will not provide a full account of even 
 
 6. I do think what I say here can have some effects upon permissible forms of 
national community, but I will not explore this here in any detail. 
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the distinctively political aspects of immigration.  In particular, I will 
ignore what is likely the most pressing issue in immigration: how we 
might identify that set of people whose antecedent circumstances are 
bad enough to warrant an independent right to immigration.  In other 
words, I will avoid entirely any discussion of refugee or asylee status or 
any related status that might be introduced in a fuller account of immigrant 
rights.  I assume, of course, that any plausible theory of immigration 
must have a place for such rights.  The question to which I attend here is 
one that begins where such rights leave off.  When no individual applicant 
has a right to enter a given state, and there are more prospective 
immigrants than the state wishes to admit, what character of reasons 
might be given to justify differentiating between these prospective 
immigrants?  What rights does a state have, consistent with its self-
description as liberal, to pick and choose among those who want to enter 
it?  I have already discussed this question in relation to the ethnic and 
racial makeup of the society in question; where the state has a certain 
minority group, I claim, it is impermissibly illiberal to discriminate 
against prospective immigrants belonging to that group.  This policy 
would send a message of social and political inequality to current 
citizens belonging to that state’s population.7  I want here to begin the 
more difficult process of examining this question from the perspective of 
nonmembers, rather than members. 
As above, I suggest that we begin to answer this question by 
acknowledging the moral centrality of the ideal of moral equality.  To be 
liberal, a liberal state must acknowledge the moral importance of all 
persons—not simply citizens, but persons generally.  To do otherwise is 
to place an illegitimate range restriction on the applicability of liberalism’s 
moral guarantees, which would indeed place a notion of feudal birthright 
privilege back into the heart of liberal equality.  The notion of moral 
equality, however, does not determine a unique set of political entitlements.  
Moral equality will demand different packages of rights and obligations 
in different institutional contexts.  An easy example of this is found in 
the conventional analysis of voting rights.  The French government, to 
consider itself liberal, must regard both French citizens and American 
citizens as morally equal; there can be no legitimate sense in which it is 
permissible to regard French people as morally superior in virtue of their 
citizenship.  Nonetheless, the French government is entirely correct to 
extend voting rights in French elections only to French citizens, rather 
than to both French and American citizens.  Nothing in this restriction 
offends the notion that Americans are equal in dignity to the French.  
 
 7. Michael Blake, Discretionary Immigration, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 273, 284 (2002). 
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The restriction recognizes, rather, the distinct institutional contexts in 
which French and American citizens are situated.  French citizens, being 
coercively ruled by a set of French legal and political institutions, are 
entitled to guarantees of political equality simply inapplicable to the set 
of both French and American citizens.  Nothing here is a denial of moral 
equality.  The different set of political entitlements reflects the distinct 
implications of moral equality in distinct institutional circumstances; it 
respects, rather than abandons, the notion of moral egalitarianism. 
I want to be clear about the moral framework I am suggesting.  I am 
arguing that moral egalitarianism is in fact compatible with differentiated 
packages of rights; when people live under different institutional 
circumstances, it is only appropriate for us to infer different sets of 
mutual duties and rights.  To do otherwise runs the risk of treating 
entities that are not alike as if they were alike—which is itself a violation 
of equal treatment.  I do not, therefore, argue that coercion creates moral 
duties out of thin air; rather, I argue that when individuals face the shared 
web of coercion constitutive of a modern political state, they acquire 
distinct duties to one another in virtue of this fact—but that these duties 
are simply one specific form of a moral general duty to treat all individuals 
with equal concern and respect.8  State coercion must be justified specifically 
to those individuals coerced, and such justification may require the 
provision of certain institutional and material goods; in particular, I think 
that rights of democratic citizenship and material equality may stand as 
the precondition of legitimate state coercion.  Only by the provision of 
such rights, I argue, can the ongoing fact of state coercion be transformed 
into the morally acceptable terms of reciprocal agreement and cooperation. 
Nothing I say here, however, argues that only state coercion towards 
citizens stands in need of justification.  Indeed, all forms of coercion 
require some form of justification to be understood as morally permissible.  
This fact will have implications in a wide variety of contexts; much of 
international trade and diplomacy, after all, has a distinctively coercive 
flavor.9  The point I make here is more modest and methodological: I 
 
 8. Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 257, 257, 266 (2001). 
 9. This fact is emphasized by Thomas Christiano in his excellent contribution to 
this volume.  I would note in response to him only that the analysis of state coercion I 
offer does not insist that such coercion is the only relationship creating specific moral 
duties above those of shared humanity.  However, it is a form of coercion that creates 
special duties of political equality, so that such coercion might be—as much as 
possible—understood as a process of ongoing consent and cooperation.  Each form of 
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argue only that each case of coercion must be understood as prima facie 
morally impermissible and therefore needing justification or elimination.  
However, each case of coercion will give rise to different forms of 
justification, which in turn will give rise to distinct moral rights and 
duties.  Not all coercion, after all, looks quite like the ongoing and pervasive 
power of a political state over its citizens. 
A valid analysis of the morality of immigration will have to take 
account of these facts.  Prospective immigrants ought to be regarded as 
having a certain highly specific institutional relationship to the state to 
which they seek immigration.  Their relationship is distinct from that 
held by current citizens.  For example, prospective immigrants are not 
yet enmeshed in the set of civil and criminal laws maintained by the 
state; they are under no obligation to pay taxes to that state, nor can they 
invoke the machinery of that state in the settlement of private disputes.  
As such, it would be a mistake to regard their mobility rights as being in 
any way comparable to those of current members.  As I have said 
elsewhere, it is one thing to deny someone from Toronto the right to 
move to Boston; it is, morally speaking, quite another to deny someone 
from Buffalo the right to move to Boston—a conclusion which follows 
even if we assume citizenship to be a morally arbitrary fact of birth. 
But if the relationship of prospective immigrants to the state is not that 
of current citizens, neither is it the relationship of foreign nationals more 
generally.  Even if the world is sufficiently interconnected that no one is 
without some ties to some foreign state, prospective immigrants have a 
highly specific tie to a state that is not their own.  Through their voluntary 
action, they have placed themselves within the coercive grasp of a foreign 
state for at least one act of adjudication.  Prospective immigrants have 
voluntarily come to a border, whether literally or through the legal act of 
application, and have agreed to have the legal machinery of the state 
determine their application for membership.  That this determination is 
ultimately coercive is hard to deny.  As Joseph Carens notes, “Borders 
have guards and the guards have guns.”10  Prospective immigrants have 
voluntarily placed themselves within the power of those guards by 
accepting the legitimate authority of the state to determine the result of 
their claims. 
I take it for granted that this coercion stands in as much need of moral 
justification as the more standard case of state citizenship.  Coercion, 
after all, is always prima facie an act in violation of moral equality; it 
 
coercion, however, demands its own form of justification and thus gives rise to its own 
set of rights and duties.  See Thomas Christiano, Immigration, Political Community, and 
Cosmopolitanism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933, 940 (2008). 
 10. Carens, supra note 4, at 251. 
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replaces the will of an individual agent with the will of another.  
Coercion, then, stands in need of justification, and this justification must 
take the form of reasons we may provide to those who are coerced.  
Following Tim Scanlon, I regard the search for justification as the search 
for reasons we could not reasonably reject for the actions and 
circumstances to which we are subjected.11  Our task thus becomes that 
of finding reasons we can give to prospective immigrants to justify the 
coercive threats they face in the course of applying for entry. 
We begin with the idea of consent.  To the extent that prospective 
immigrants have voluntarily accepted the coercive regime to which they 
are subject, that regime might be viewed as justified through their giving 
of consent.  This would seem to give some reason we might cite in showing 
that prospective immigrants have no right to regard the use of force to 
exclude them as illegitimate.  We might further note that in seeking admission 
to the state, prospective immigrants are asking for a benefit to which 
they are not, by hypothesis, already entitled.  We must remember that we 
are not dealing with a claim by a refugee or someone whose antecedent 
conditions would make admission morally pressing.  Prospective immigrants 
who cross the border without permission seek to acquire something to 
which they have no right—whether this thing is understood in terms of 
place, polity, or people.  As such, the state exercising coercion may justify 
itself with reference to the legitimacy of coercive force in the prevention 
of unjust acquisition.  The state may legitimately defend itself against 
those who seek a good to which they have no right, and the prospective 
immigrant here would seem to have no cause to complain.12 
 
 11. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 21, 45 (1998). 
 12. Arash Abizadeh has impressed upon me the idea that state coercion holds even 
upon those who do not perform the actions invoking such coercion—just as the domestic 
law against murder might be thought to coerce even a peaceful citizen who would never 
dream of harming another person.  If this is so, then why does the coercion of the border 
here not extend to all persons in the world, rather than to only those who seek 
admission?  I would note, in response, that border coercion does in fact hold against all 
persons—and is justified, in general, by the fact that the person who seeks to immigrate 
without right is taking a benefit to which he is not entitled.  The coercive threat, here, is 
justified through the very procedural means of citing the unjustified nature of the border 
crossing imagined.  Thus, I am indeed coerced by the immigration policies of Guatemala— 
even though I have no particular desire to go there—because of the coercive threat of 
violence if I were to choose to cross Guatemalan borders.  Such a coercive threat, 
however, is justified simply by virtue of the fact that I would be joining Guatemalan 
society without permission were I to enter Guatemala without submitting to Guatemalan 
legal authority for adjudication.  Once again, all this holds only in those cases in which I 
have no antecedent moral right to enter another country; the analysis here would change 
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One must remember that in the cases we are examining, admission to 
citizenship is a discretionary benefit.  However, it is also important to 
remember that political justice requires equal treatment for all of those 
people who share the same institutional relationship to the state.  The 
just state may not treat people who are similarly situated, as regards the 
state, in a manner demonstrating an illegitimate moral contempt for 
some subset of that group.  The set of prospective immigrants does not 
have the same rights as the set of current members before the state; 
however, prospective immigrants do have certain rights to be treated as 
equal to one another in determining what benefits they receive.  We 
should also remember that these conclusions continue even if what the 
state is providing is a purely discretionary good, which the government 
might legitimately decide to extend to no one.  That is, political equality 
can be violated by unequal provision even of those things no one has a 
moral right to receive.  We see this easily in the domestic context; a state 
which gave new cars to all and only white men would be guilty of racial 
discrimination even if it had no duty to give cars to anyone.  Those who 
did not receive such cars would quite rightly complain that no valid 
principle could ground such a discriminatory form of distribution.  Their 
complaint would not be mollified by the response that the state, in giving 
cars, was providing a benefit it had no obligation to provide to anyone.  
The complaint, instead, looked to the idea that a valid reason—a reason 
that could not be reasonably rejected—must be provided to justify the 
distribution of any good provided by a political and coercive entity such 
as a state.  Such a reason would have to treat all of those members of the 
society as moral equals, rather than treating some members as simply 
more deserving or better individuals than others. 
This fact might be the beginning of our understanding of the rights of 
prospective immigrants.  The mere fact that they are seeking a benefit to 
which they are not entitled, and so have voluntarily placed themselves 
within a political and coercive relationship in the pursuit of this benefit, 
does not mean that the state in question has a right to use that coercive 
power in any manner it might choose.  Instead, if we take the relationship of 
prospective immigrants as a sui generis form of political relationship, we 
arrive at the conclusion that a just state has an obligation to treat such 
prospective immigrants as equal to one another, in virtue of the more 
general obligation such states, in their exercises of coercive power, have 
to treat individuals as moral equals.  The state does not have the obligation 
to treat such prospective immigrants as political equals to current 
citizens; for instance, it is not illegitimate to refuse prospective immigrants 
 
significantly were Guatemala not morally permitted to use force to exclude me from 
entering its territory.  I am grateful to Abizadeh for discussion of this point. 
BLAKE.PRINTER.DOC 11/25/2008  2:01:20 PM 
[VOL. 45:  963, 2008]  Immigration and Political Equality 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 971 
rights to vote or to invoke the civil law prior to their admission to the 
status of immigrant.  The distinct institutional circumstances of citizens 
and prospective immigrants mean that nothing in that treatment will 
violate moral equality.  But the state surely does violate its duties when 
it treats prospective immigrants as morally unequal to one another.  The 
reasons it gives for distinguishing among such immigrants, that is, must 
be reasons that could not be reasonably refused even by those whose 
claim to admission is denied.  On this model, the state has a general right 
to keep out prospective immigrants; egalitarianism does not demand 
open borders.  But when the state selects only some prospective immigrants 
for admission, it must rely upon reasons that reflect the moral equality of 
all prospective immigrants—reasons that ought to be accepted in the end 
even by those excluded.  This is all that political equality among prospective 
immigrants ought to demand. 
What would this mean in practice?  It is helpful to examine here more 
closely the idea of having reasons that we could not reasonably reject.  If 
they are to meet this test, the reasons we give to persons must take their 
interests seriously as separate and inviolable moral persons.  What this 
would mean is always difficult to determine with any degree of specificity.  
It will always depend upon the specific institutional context in which the 
guarantee of equality is to be applied.  The justification of state actions 
to current citizens, for example, may require quite a thick package of 
rights and duties, including some guarantees of material equality.  What 
is required in the context of prospective immigrants, by contrast, will be 
more simple, given that what is to be justified to equal persons is not an 
entire set of coercive political institutions, but a single coercive decision 
regarding admission.  What we seek here are not the political guarantees 
of equal citizenship but the more thin forms of equal treatment appropriate 
to this context.  Thus, the justification must be of a character that takes 
seriously the moral equality of persons and that could be accepted by 
those to whom it is addressed without requiring them to agree to their 
own moral inequality. 
There are several principles that states use to differentiate between 
prospective immigrants that could meet this test.  In what follows, I want 
to describe two potential principles of differentiation that might be 
acceptable—and one that definitely would not.  The two principles I describe 
are principles commonly cited by states in defense of their policies and 
so might be thought to be relatively friendly to the exclusionary policies 
of current governments.  As I will explain at the end, this impression is 
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only partly correct; for these principles to be justly used to differentiate 
between prospective immigrants, certain factual conditions must hold 
true, and it is not clear how often this will be the case.  As such, 
defenders of closed borders may find less comfort here than they might 
originally have expected. 
Thus, we seek categories of reasons in justification of coercion that 
might be accepted by those who are coerced, where such reasons respect 
the ideal of moral equality.  As such, the reasons must reflect concerns 
that can be expected to resonate with all parties to the interaction, rather 
than relying either covertly or overtly upon the diminished moral status 
of some portion of the population.  Two categories might be introduced 
here, although I think they are likely far from exhaustive.  They both 
have to do with the preconditions of success as a democratic community, 
which we may assume reflect a set of considerations whose importance 
we regard as sufficient to motivate a legitimate distinction between 
prospective immigrants.  The first category is “economic success.”  To 
some greater or lesser degree, all states do privilege scarce job skills in 
the selection of immigrants.  It is difficult to regard this as objectionable 
from the standpoint of social justice—bearing in mind, as above, that we 
are discussing here only individuals with no individual right to status as 
immigrant.  If a state seeks to distinguish between two individuals, 
neither of whom has any title to entry, based upon how much each 
immigrant is able to provide for the economic health of the society in 
question, it is hard to see how this principle offends the normative 
equality between persons we endorse.  The moral equality of persons, 
after all, requires us to give reasons to people that they could not 
reasonably reject; it rules out reasons that demand the moral denigration 
of some segment of the population in question.  Moral equality does not, 
however, demand that we refuse to make distinctions based upon 
genuinely relevant considerations.  Economic success ought to be recognized 
as at least a potentially legitimate subject for government policy; after 
all, the development of a competitive economy with a sufficient tax base 
is one of the most central policy imperatives of any society.  As such, it 
seems that we can legitimately distinguish between prospective immigrants 
based upon this category without worrying that reliance upon this 
category implies an abandonment of moral equality. 
There are, of course, some deep moral worries about even this category.  
It might be thought that using such justifications is itself morally 
problematic, in that it simply accepts as part of the moral world facts 
that are themselves subject to moral analysis.  Imagine, for example, that 
women tend to be less well-educated than men as a result of ongoing 
gender hierarchy or institutional sexism in many foreign societies.  To 
prefer the well-educated in this context is to give privilege to those who 
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have already gained benefits from an unjust social system—and to 
punish those who have already been treated unjustly.  This problem is 
exacerbated when the injustice is one in which the society accepting 
immigrants has been complicit; if persistent underdevelopment is even 
partly the result of the unjust foreign policy and practices of our own 
state, then it seems rather unjust to refuse admission to prospective 
immigrants on the basis that they have not acquired an adequate level of 
skills.13 
These facts, however, may not be sufficient to overcome the legitimacy 
of the preference for skilled immigrants.  There are at least two things 
that might be noted in response.  The first, and less important, is that the 
causal story here is subject to much dispute; it is not always clear exactly 
who is responsible for underdevelopment, so any particular story about 
blame is likely to be contentious and subject to troublesome empirical 
counterexamples.14  The second, and more important point, is that it is 
not clear that recognizing these facts produces a duty to permit immigration, 
rather than a duty to alleviate international poverty and injustice more 
generally.  After all, the morality of immigration does not exhaust international 
morality.  Where injustice exists—and especially where our society has 
had a historical role in perpetuating it—we have a duty to effectuate 
institutional change so as to overcome that injustice.  Nothing in this, 
however, requires us to think of entry into our society as the favored 
institutional response.  The following analogy might be helpful: I contemplate 
hiring you as my surgeon but carelessly burn your hand with coffee as I 
walk into your office.  It is clear that I owe you something—compensation 
for your unjustly burned hand, at least—but it is not clear that I have any 
obligation to let you continue acting as my surgeon.  However unjust it 
may be, you simply do not have the skills required to do the job.  If this 
is so—and if no particular surgeon has a right to act as my surgeon—
then my moral duties do not include a general prohibition on taking 
skills into account in choosing a surgeon, a fact which remains true even 
when the skill sets are the result of injustice.15  Something similar must 
 
 13. This worry has been impressed upon me by Lori Watson—whose commentary 
provides an excellent development of these ideas—and Rogers Smith.  See Lori Watson, 
Equal Justice: Comment on Michael Blake’s Immigration and Political Equality, 45 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 981, 984–85 (2008). 
 14. See Mathias Risse, Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?, 
19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 9, 13 (2005). 
 15. This analogy is due to Larry Alexander, who suggested this line of response to 
me. 
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hold true internationally as well; the foreign poor have a great many 
moral rights that are currently being ignored, but it is not clear to me that 
a right to entry into a foreign society is one of them. 
A second category, also much employed by current states, is that of 
“political integration.”  Given that democratic life requires not simply 
democratic institutions, but also individuals willing and able to engage 
in democratic political deliberation, it seems difficult to deny that states 
may have a legitimate preference for those who are more able to engage 
in the activities constituting political engagement.  These abilities include 
skills such as language competence, political sophistication, and perhaps 
a demonstrated affinity for democratic practice.  Again, it should be 
emphasized that nothing here would be legitimate as a way of defeating 
an independent claim made on behalf of a refugee or asylee.  As applied 
within the pool of prospective discretionary immigrants, however, it seems 
entirely plausible to suggest that distinguishing based upon traits such as 
these does not betray moral contempt or inequality.  For prospective 
immigrants to be politically equal to one another, we must only arrive 
at reasons that ought to motivate all members of the pool of prospective 
immigrants; it is difficult to deny that the continued functioning of the 
democratic community constitutes a reason of this character. 
There are, of course, some significant questions about this pattern 
of reasoning.  The most important is how far the notion of “continued 
functioning” can be pressed.  We might imagine, for example, a society 
that takes itself as having a particular mission—the preservation of a 
certain kind of music, to pick an example less fraught with historical 
problems.16  If a given pattern of immigration would make the success of 
that mission less likely, can we legitimately use the reasoning discussed 
here to restrict such immigration?  Could a society of individuals who 
love classical music seek to exclude all those who enjoy acid jazz? 
The answer here is likely no—at least not without some additional 
arguments I think are likely to ultimately fail.  The pattern of argument 
suggested above looks for a basis of adjudication that is uncontroversial 
in that it relies upon interests and desires all persons could be expected 
to recognize.  The continued functioning of democratic society is clearly 
a case of this.  Once we distinguish between the continued existence of a 
democratic society and the continuation of a particular character of that 
society, things become more controversial.  What the classical music 
lovers want is not simply a democratic society but a society in which 
democratic institutions defend certain specific forms of music.  Were 
immigration to increase from acid jazz loving nations, it seems likely 
 
 16. This example is due to Steve Smith. 
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that what would happen is not the collapse of democratic governance but 
rather the alteration of what specific forms of music are to be found 
within the society so governed.  To defend a particular character of society 
is much more controversial; it borrows much from the idea that each 
state has a national or racial identity whose preservation is a legitimate 
ground for immigration policy.  In this paper, I want to avoid grounding 
immigration decisions on this sort of consideration.  Therefore, we must 
stick with a more restrictive vision of democratic life as a basis for 
immigrant policy.  We must show that a given set of immigrants is not 
willing to play the game of democratic governance—and not simply that 
such immigrants are likely to alter the nature of the social goods such a 
democratic society might pursue. 
The above two reasons seem to give us some tools with which to 
justify principles by which prospective immigrants might be excluded.  
It is beneficial, by contrast, to consider some reasons that would fail the 
tests discussed here.  Chief among these is the simple denial of moral 
equality between members of the pool of prospective immigrants.  A 
policy that begins with the premise that certain forms of individuals are 
simply better than others is a policy that could not even begin to pass the 
tests demanded by the concept of political equality.  It is rare to find a 
policy that simply and boldly asserts the superiority of one category of 
person over another—although some historical examples have come 
quite close.  Here, we may cite the White Australia policy,17 the pre-1990 
policy in which homosexuality was a valid ground for exclusion from 
the United States,18 and Justice Brewer’s implicit justification of an anti-
immigrant statute as legitimately held against the “obnoxious Chinese.”19  It 
is difficult to describe any of these policies without understanding them 
as a simple statement of the superiority of one form of person over another.  
As such, using these reasons to differentiate between prospective immigrants 
 
 17. For a discussion of this policy, see Carlos Scott Lopez, Australian Immigration 
Policy at the Centenary: The Quest for Control, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 17–21 (2003). 
 18. The law was formally changed in 1990 but had been only rarely invoked prior 
to that.  See Barbara Vobejda, Broad Immigration Changes Approved, WASH. POST, Oct. 
28, 1990, at A1; Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. 
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 
778–79 (1993). 
 19. “It is true this statute is directed only against the obnoxious Chinese; but if the 
power exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-morrow against other classes and 
other people?”  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
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would be morally impermissible; to accept these reasons would require 
parts of the pool of prospective immigrants to accept their own subordinate 
moral status. 
At this point, however, we arrive at a bit of a difficulty because there 
is no bright line between policies of exclusion that look like the 
acceptable ones described above, and policies that look more like a 
simple case of racial or ethnic hierarchy.  In the first instance, the message 
of any particular form of policy is always subject to interpretation—and, 
in the context of immigration, frequently subject to interpretation by 
more than one cultural framework.  It is difficult to get any agreement 
here on whether a given piece of policy unjustly privileges one group or 
justly differentiates based upon neutral reasons.  More difficult is the 
fact that even the most racially hateful forms of differentiation can often 
be dressed up and justified with reference to apparently neutral principles.20  
Even the most gutter forms of racism can be given a veneer of legitimacy 
with the application of arguments to the effect that some group of 
prospective immigrants will necessarily be a drag on the public purse or 
cannot be relied upon to participate in democratic life.21 
How then can we distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate 
forms of the exclusionary principle?  The most important thing to note 
here—and the aspect of my argument which will provide more comfort 
to the advocates of immigration than to their opponents—is that all the 
reasons given above must, in the end, be factually valid before they are 
morally valid.  In order for a reason to function as sufficient to justify 
coercion to all parties, it has to have a sufficient empirical basis to 
ground the distinction’s legitimacy.  This is an underexplored aspect of 
contractarian methodology; the reasons we cannot reasonably reject have 
this character, in part, because of their empirical plausibility.  In other 
words, factual truth has moral relevance in the process of reason-giving.  
If a given justification cannot be shown to have empirical validity, then 
those who are affected by that justification can reasonably reject its 
application.  Here, a claim without sufficient factual justification—
for example, that members of my group are inadequate democratic 
participants—is a claim that can be rejected in virtue of its falsity.  As 
such, those who treat me as unequal to my fellow prospective 
immigrants based upon this reason do me an injustice.  Here, I am being 
treated as less than morally equal, insofar as the reasons I face for my 
 
 20. See MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 62–63 (2001), for a 
defense of this claim. 
 21. A much more vexing case—and one I cannot adequately explore here—is the 
possible existence of a form of justification that is simultaneously demeaning and true.  I 
am grateful to Alan Patten for raising this possibility, even though I can here only 
acknowledge the possibility of such cases. 
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exclusion are not reasons I can be justifiably expected to endorse.  I am, 
instead, subject to a simple case of illegitimate and invidious distinction; 
the fact that the distinction has been justified with reference to a (false) 
empirical generalization does not remove the taint of injustice. 
What this means in the end is that political equality may constrain our 
ability as a state to exclude prospective immigrants.  More precisely, we 
may have a limited ability to give principles justifying the different 
treatments we propose to give different parts of the pool of prospective 
immigrants.  Even those prospective immigrants who have no independent 
claim to admission, and who are not by definition current citizens of the 
state in question, may make claims of justice against the application of 
certain principles.  Their claim must be to treatment as equals in the 
political context of the pool of prospective applicants.  This claim, in 
turn, means that the country to which they are applying has duties to 
justify its exclusionary acts in certain specific ways.  It may differentiate 
between persons only when sufficient evidence exists to motivate the 
distinction; evidence, that is, that the reasonable agent could be expected 
to interpret as factually sufficient to justify a difference in political 
treatment.  This result does not give prospective immigrants the right to 
open borders; policies might be imagined that can meet this test.  It does 
mean, however, that prospective immigrants may make claims in justice 
against the state in virtue of the character of reasons they face for their 
exclusion.  Prospective immigrants are neither politically nor morally 
nonentities.  They do not have the same rights as current citizens, but 
they do have the right to complain when policies excluding them are not 
empirically valid.  As such, states cannot distinguish between prospective 
immigrants as they see fit, even when such immigrants do not have 
independent claims to entry. 
This leads to some rather surprising results.  It seems that prospective 
immigrants may have stronger rights to have good evidence used in 
justification of laws than current members of society.  In ordinary democratic 
life, after all, we are generally entitled to make our own mistakes, rely 
upon faulty evidence, and choose economically disastrous policy for 
ourselves; so long as we do not violate moral rights or procedural 
safeguards, we are generally permitted to be as foolish as we want.  Why 
then do prospective immigrants have rights to factual showings greater 
than those held by democratic insiders? 
The response goes to the very nature of the democratic project.  In this 
case, we are entitled to make our own mistakes in large part because 
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we—as a community—will be governed by the law created.  So long as 
what we do is compatible with substantive and procedural justice, we are 
able to pursue foolish policies because we are the ones who choose such 
foolish policies for ourselves.  I have suggested earlier that the goal of 
democratic life is the transformation of coercive law into something that 
is reciprocally justified through the ongoing process of consent and 
participation.  This transformation gives us the moral right to rely upon 
faulty reasoning in political life.  It is precisely because the prospective 
immigrant is not yet part of this community that he has a greater right to 
have accurate factual information given to him.  Such an immigrant is 
not yet part of the group of people making laws together, but only seeks 
to become so.  In the single decision that constitutes the acceptance or 
refusal of this desire, he has a right to a standard of evidence greater than 
that applicable to domestic adjudication.  I do not claim that there could 
be any legal way of instantiating this moral requirement; we could imagine 
the creation of an instrument guaranteeing the legal right to such a 
showing of evidence, but such an instrument is both hypothetical and 
deeply unlikely to be forthcoming.  I claim only that immigrants may be 
entitled to a greater showing of factual evidence than that applicable 
domestically.  Their status as nonparticipants in the system excludes them 
from certain moral rights as regards government policy; if what I say 
here is correct, though, it may also create distinct political rights as 
well.22 
I would conclude only with an acknowledgment of how incomplete 
the answer given here really is.  It is incomplete because, to apply it 
in practice, we would have to know what the standard is for empirical 
adequacy.  Given that social science is rarely as precise or as unanimous 
as we would like, it seems unjust to demand that the state can only be 
justified if it has a perfect factual basis for its actions.  I cannot defend 
the conclusion, but I suspect that something like the preponderance of 
the evidence might be usefully employed as a standard here for what 
factual showings the state must make.  I would note, further, that the 
answer I have given here is incomplete also in that it does not address 
 
 22. Another possibility, of course, is to include such individuals within the democratic 
process by creating new forms of political institutions.  We might imagine here that 
democratic decisions regarding immigration could be made jointly by those who are 
currently citizens and those who are prospective immigrants.  I think, however, that such 
institutions are both unlikely to come into existence and would be theoretically unmotivated if 
it is possible for us to articulate moral standards that are sufficient to protect the interests 
and moral rights of prospective immigrants.  Such moral standards might not be adequately 
protected by current political practices, but our task in the present context is the 
discussion of moral rights, prior to the discussion of institutional responses necessary for 
the efficient defense of such rights.  I am grateful to Arash Abizadeh for discussion 
of these issues. 
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what forms of antecedent circumstances might give rise to a claim for 
immigration rights; as I have already mentioned, this form of inquiry 
may be the more important one, given the highly imperfect and unjust 
world in which we live.  The answer is incomplete, finally, in that it does 
not engage with immigration as a phenomenon involving geography and 
nationalism—with, as I have said, the place and the people.  A fuller 
account of immigration would involve making sense of all three of these 
alterations as well as their interrelationships. 
Nonetheless, I hope what I have done here is a useful first step.  What 
I hope to have shown is that immigration can be discussed from the 
standpoint of political justice without reducing immigration either to 
charity or to a human right.  By paying closer attention to the distinct 
political status of prospective immigrants, we may have arrived at a 
conclusion in which such individuals are able to make claims of justice 
against the state—but in which such claims of justice are distinct from 
those that might be made by current citizens.  This methodology, however 
rough, represents a potentially fruitful beginning for the analysis of the 
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